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Abstract
We study the role of high-frequency trading in a dynamic limit order market. Being fast is
valuable because it enables traders to revise outstanding limit orders upon news arrivals when
interacting with slow market participants. On the one hand, the existence of fast traders can
help to reduce the ine¢ ciency that is rooted in the risk of being "picked o¤" after unfavourable
price movements and therefore allows more gains from trade to be realized. On the other hand,
slow traders face a relative loss in bargaining power which leads them to strategically submit
limit orders with a lower execution probability, thereby reducing trade. Due to this negative
externality, the equilibrium level of investment is always welfare-reducing. The model generates
additional testable implications regarding the e¤ects of high-frequency trading on order ow
statistics.
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1 Introduction
While the proverb "time is money" applies to virtually all economic activities, the accelerated prolif-
eration of electronic trading has taken this wisdom to the extreme. High-frequency trading (HFT),
a variant of algorithmic trading, relies on sophisticated computer programs for the implementation
of trading strategies that involve a vast amount of orders in very small time intervals. Proprietary
trading desks, hedge funds and so-called pure-play HFT outlets are investing large sums into human
("Quants") and physical (IT and data) capital in an e¤ort to outpace the competition. Recent
estimates suggest that HFTs are now responsible for more than 50% of trading in U.S. equities.1
These developments are being accompanied by a heated debate among nancial economists,
practitioners, and regulators about the implications of an increasing computerization of the trading
process. While proponents2 argue that technology increases market e¢ ciency via improved liquidity
and price discovery, critiques3 claim that HFTs make prots at the expense of other (slow) market
participants and have the potential to destabilize markets.
This paper contributes to this debate by presenting a stylized model of trading in a limit order
market where agents di¤er in their trading speed, which is thought to capture the di¤erence between
(fast) HFTs and (slow) human market participants. We build on the model of Foucault (1999), in
which limit orders cannot be revised after submission and thus may become stale due to the arrival
of new value-relevant information. This risk of being "picked o¤" (Copeland and Galai (1983)) by
the following trader is a source of ine¢ ciency because a high level of asset price volatility leads
agents to choose limit orders with a low execution probability, which implies that some potential
gains from trade are not realized. We extend Foucaults model by endowing a proportion  of the
trading crowd with a relative speed advantage that improves their ability to manage outstanding
limit orders compared to the remaining market participants. More specically, we assume that fast
traders (FTs) are able to revise their limit orders after news releases, but only in case the next agent
is a slow trader (ST).
We analyze the stationary equilibrium of this dynamic limit order market and compare it with
the baseline case of identical traders studied by Foucault (1999). In order to convey the intuition it
is convenient to interpret the model as a sequential bargaining process over a total surplus of 2L,
which is the di¤erence in valuations across buyers and sellers. Upon arriving at the market, a trader
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (limit order) to the following agent, who either accepts this o¤er (via
a market order) or in turn makes another o¤er to the trader arriving after him. As usual in these
situations, each agents bargaining power is determined by his outside option which here is given by
1See Financial Times, High-frequency boom time hits slowdown, April 12, 2011.
2See e.g. Optiver, High Frequency Trading, Position Paper, 2011, http://fragmentation.dessa.com/wp-
content/uploads/High-Frequency-Trading-Optiver-Position-Paper.pdf
3See SEC Chairman Mary Schapiros speech in front of the Security Traders Association "Remarks Before the
Security Traders Association", www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch092210mls.htm.
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the expected payo¤ earned from posting a limit order.
Now the fact that FTs do not face the risk of being picked o¤ when interacting with STs has
two opposing e¤ects. First, the ability to revise quotes after news arrivals reduces the ine¢ ciency
that arises when agents submit limit orders with a low execution probability. This allows more
gains from trade to be reaped. Second, the outside option of posting limit orders is more valuable
to FTs than to STs and therefore they require a higher share of the surplus in order to accept
an outstanding o¤er. Hence STs face a dilemma: They can either keep their chances of execution
constant by posting more aggressive quotes that are attractive to both STs and FTs, or instead
accept a decrease in the execution probability of their limit orders by only targeting STs. While
their expected prots from posting limit orders decrease in either case, the latter choice (which is
optimal for  su¢ ciently small) gives rise to an ine¢ ciency because it reduces the chances that the
surplus 2L is shared.
As the choice between market and limit orders is endogenous in this model, the decrease in STs
outside option indirectly also a¤ects the prots they derive from market orders because they are
willing to accept worse quotes than in a market without FTs. Additionally, they are too slow to
"pick o¤" FTs and therefore lose protable trading opportunities. Because agentsexpected utility
is a weighted average of prots due to submitting limit and market orders, it follows that STs are
always worse o¤.
This has important implications for welfare, in particular once one drops the assumption that 
is exogenous and instead assumes that agents may become fast by investing into HFT technology
at a xed cost. As an (interior) equilibrium requires equal payo¤s across slow and fast agents, any
investment into HFT leads to a social welfare loss in equilibrium.
We additionally derive several testable implications regarding the e¤ect of HFT on the order
ow composition. For example our model predicts that FTs are more likely to be makers (liquidity
suppliers) than takers (liquidity consumers) and display a higher ratio of limit to market orders
than STs. These implications are consistent with the widespread market making activities of large
HFT rms and are also in line with recent empirical ndings. We also link make-take and order
submission decisions to the traded assets fundamental volatility. Finally, one additional testable
prediction from our model is that STs react to HFT entry by submitting limit orders with lower
execution probabilities.
Because HFT activity consitutes a negative externality, our results have important implications
for policy makers. Currently, a number of di¤erent measures are being discussed among regulators
that aim to curb HFT activity, including minimum order resting times and limits on the number
of messages that individual traders can send.4 While these measures could eventually improve on
the market outcome by eliminating HFT activity, the present analysis suggests that they would also
4See e.g. Financial Times, "Berlin forges ahead with trading controls", September 25th, 2012.
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deprive the market of potential e¢ ciency gains because it is precisely FTsability to revise their
limit orders quickly that allows more gains from trade to be realized. It may be more e¤ective to
tax HFT activities directly in order to ensure that at least some of the potential benets of speed
are reaped.
The literature on algorithmic and high-frequency trading has grown substantially in the past
couple of years (see e.g. the surveys by Biais and Woolley (2012) and Foucault (2012)). Most
closely related to this work is the paper by Biais et al. (2012) which studies the impact of HFT in a
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) framework. In their model FTs have a higher chance of nding trading
opportunities than slow market participants which increases the likelihood that gains from trade are
realized. But at the same time, FTs are a source of adverse selection because they possess private
information, which raises the bid-ask spread payable by everyone and therefore reduces trade. If
the proportion of FTs is endogenized, this negative externality implies that investment in HFT is
excessive in equilibrium just as in this paper. While both papers share this result, the nature of the
underlying externality is very di¤erent. Di¤erent from Biais et al. (2012), FTs are not a source of
adverse selection in our model but instead help to reduce adverse selection by being able to revise
limit orders after news arrivals. While this dampens an existing ine¢ ciency, it constitutes a loss in
bargaining power for slow market participants and leads them to submit limit orders with a lower
execution probability.
Also closely related, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2012) study competitive middlemen that interme-
diate between early limit order traders and late market order traders. As in this study, HFTsspeed
advantage may reduce adverse selection by updating quotes quickly and therefore increase trade.
On the other hand, HFTsability to process (hard) information quickly can introduce an additional
adverse selection problem that reduces trade. A calibration exercise reveals a slight increase in
welfare.
A number of other papers study HFT from a theoretical perspective. Cartea and Penalva (2011)
propose a model where their increased speed allows HFT to impose a haircut on liquidity traders,
which increases trading volume and price volatility, but lowers the welfare of liquidity traders.
Foucault et al. (2013) study the trading strategy of an informed trader that is able to react faster
than others to news. They conclude that this speed advantage makes the informed traders order
ow more volatile and increases his relative share in trading volume. Rosu and Martinez (2012)
study HFTs as strategic informed traders who instantaneously react to new information and ensure
that it is reected in prices immediately. Finally, Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) provide a model
where competing exchanges invest into speed and compete for investors. They provide conditions
under which competition, fragmentation and speed can improve or reduce welfare.
Several studies empirically examine the impact of algorithmic and high-frequency trading on
market quality. In summary, this stream of the literature concludes that automated trading strategies
improve liquidity (Hendershott et al. (2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2011)), are highly protable
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(e.g. Menkveld (2012)), and contribute to price discovery (e.g. Hendershott and Riordan (2012),
Hendershott et al. (2012)). In line with our ndings on the e¤ects of speed in a limit order market,
Hendershott and Riordan (2012) nd that algorithmic traders "supply liquidity when it is expensive
and consume liquidity when it is cheap". Hagströmer and Norden (2013) and Malinova et al.
(2012) use order level data and present evidence that is consistent with HFTs primarily engaging
in market making activities. Moallemi and Saµglam (2011) provide some empirical estimates of the
"cost of latency" and nd a dramatic increase between 1995 and 2005. Chaboud et al. (2009)
study computer- and human-generated order ow in the FX market and conclude that the trading
strategies of automated traders are more correlated with each other than those of human market
participants. Kirilenko et al. (2011) examine the recent ash crash in U.S. equity markets and
nd that HFT may have exacerbated volatility during this brief liquidity crisis, although they are
not to blame for the crash itself. While most empirical studies are only restricted to a single market,
Boehmer et al. (2012) examine a sample of 39 exchanges around the world. In sum, they conrm
the view that algorithmic trading has a positive e¤ect on liqudity and price e¢ ciency, but also nd
that it increases volatility (this e¤ect is not due to improved price e¢ ciency).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an outline of the model, whose solution is
presented subsequently in Section 3. Section 4 details the implications for trading prots and the
impact of HFT on trading volume as well as other statistics of the order ow. The proportion of fast
traders is endogenized in Section 5, followed by a discussion and conclusion. All proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The limit order market
We consider an innite-horizon5 version of Foucaults (1999) dynamic limit order market. There is
a single risky asset whose fundamental value follows a random walk, i.e.
vt = vt 1 + "t
where the innovations are i.i.d. and can take values of + and   with equal probability. At each
time point t = 1; 2; : : : a new trader arrives to the marketplace in order to buy or sell the asset. In
this model, trading arises due to di¤erences in tradersprivate values for the asset. Specically, we
5This assumption is merely for convenience as it simplies the algebra. Foucault (1999) assumes that the terminal
date is stochastic, as the trading process stops after each period with constant probability 1    > 0. An innite
horizon may be interpreted as the limiting case where ! 1.
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assume that at time t0, a trader arriving at time t  t0 values the asset at
Rt0 = vt0 + yt
which is the sum of the assets current fundamental value and the time-invariant private valuation
yt. We assume that this private valuation can take two values yh = +L and yl =  L with equal
probability, where L > 0. Moreover, the private valuations are i.i.d. across traders and independent
of the asset value innovations. We call traders with a high (low) private valuation buyers (sellers).
Trading takes place in a limit order market and we assume for tractability that the order size is
xed at one unit and limit orders expire after one period. This implies that at each point in time
the limit order book either a) contains an ask quote, b) a bid quoter or c) is empty. Let Amt and
Bmt denote the best quotes at time t, where we write A
m
t =1 (Bmt =  1) if there is no ask (bid)
quote in the respective limit order book.
Unlike Foucault (1999), we assume that there are two types of agents. Agents may be either fast
traders (FTs) or slow traders (STs), and the proportion of FTs is denoted by . It is well-known that
limit orders face the risk of being "picked o¤" because the arrival of new information may render
them stale and thereby grant a free trading option to others (see e.g. Copeland and Galai (1983)).
This is also sometimes termed the winners curse because limit orders are more likely to be executed
after unfavourable price movements than after favourable ones. In this context, being fast can be
extremely valuable because it may allow for a timely cancellation or revision of limit orders and
therefore signicantly reduces the risk of being adversely selected. In order to model this advantage
in the most parsimonious way we assume that FTs can revise (or update) their limit orders after the
arrival of new information (i.e. the realization of "t+1) yet before the arrival of the next agent, but
only provided he is a ST. If the next trader is a FT as well, the order cannot be revised. STs can
never cancel their orders (as in Foucault (1999)). Notice that this implies that being fast is a purely
relative advantage, it is only valuable if there is someone slow in the market. Moreover, it implies
that the model has the same solution for all agents being slow ( = 0) and all agents being fast
( = 1). While we take  as exogenous for most of our analysis, Section 5 endogenizes investment
into trading speed, similar in spirit to Biais et al. (2012).
It is important to note that the assumption that a FT can revise his limit order if and only if
the next agent is a ST does not require that he actually knows the next agents type. To see this,
suppose that there is an outstanding limit order and " is revealed. The news arrival triggers a race
between the limit order trader and the next arriving agent, who both rush to be the rst mover (the
former to revise the limit order and the latter to execute it via a market order). In this context, the
assumption made in Foucault (1999) is that the next arriving agent always wins this race, and the
natural extension in our setting is that the next arriving agent wins unless the limit order trader is
faster than him.
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2.2 Payo¤s and strategies
For ease of exposition, we will henceforth assume that the limit order trader is always a buyer (with
private valuation yh) and the market order trader is always a seller (with private valuation yl). This
is without loss of generality because the symmetric arguments apply to limit order sellers and market
order buyers. Additionally, and for this subsection only, we will assume that sellers (buyers) do never
buy (sell) the asset. While it turns out that this is always the case in equilibrium6 , assuming it for
the moment greatly simplies the presentation here.
Now consider a seller who enters the market at time t and let V LOt;k be the expected prot he
would obtain when choosing to post a limit order, where k 2 fST; FTg refers to his type. Clearly,
he will opt for a market sell order if the best available bid price Bmt is such that
Bmt   (vt   L)  V LOt;k k 2 fST; FTg (1)
In other words, the expected prots obtained from posting limit orders constitute an endogenous
outside option when deciding upon whether or not to submit a market order. Thus the sellers order
choice is entirely determined by whether or not the best available bid is above his sell cuto¤ price,
B^k(vt), which is the bid price at which he is indi¤erent between submitting a limit order or a market
order
B^k(vt) = (vt   L) + V LOt;k k 2 fST; FTg (2)
When placing limit orders, traders generally face the tradeo¤ that more aggressive limit orders
imply a higher probability of execution but a lower prot conditional on execution. Because a limit
order placed at time t can only be executed at t+ 1, its execution does not only depend on the type
of trader that arrives in the next period but also on the realization of the asset value innovation "t+1.
Therefore, the execution probability is pinned down by the ordering of cuto¤prices, which in principle
need not be xed across di¤erent parametrizations. For example, suppose that the cuto¤ prices of
sellers arriving at time t+1 are ordered as B^ST (vt )  B^FT (vt )  B^ST (vt+)  B^FT (vt+).
Then, the unconditional execution probability p(B) of a STs buy limit order with bid price B is
given by
p(B) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0
(1 )
4
1
4
2 
4
1
2
if B < B^ST (vt   )
if B^ST (vt   )  B < B^FT (vt   )
if B^FT (vt   )  B < B^ST (vt + )
if B^ST (vt + )  B < B^FT (vt + )
if B^FT (vt + )  B
(3)
6More precisely, a buyer that decides to post a limit order at time t will always choose the bid price such that the
probability of execution conditional on a buyer arriving in period t+ 1 is equal to zero.
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Because p(B) is an increasing step function, there are multiple bid prices with the same execution
probability. Then, optimality implies that the bid price is chosen among the set of cuto¤ prices
B =
n
B^ST (vt   ); B^FT (vt   ); B^ST (vt + ); B^FT (vt + )
o
. Thus the objective function of a ST
that decides to submit a limit order can be written as
V LOt;ST = max
Bt;ST2B
fp(Bt;ST )(vt + EEx["t+1] + L Bt;ST )g (4)
where EEx[] denotes expectation conditional on execution. The decision problem of a FT opting
for limit orders is slightly more complex because he may revise his limit order upon the realization
of "t+1 conditional on the next trader being a ST. Hence they e¤ectively choose a tuple of three bid
prices (Bt;FT ; B
+
t;FT ; B
 
t;FT ). Now let qjk;"t+1 (B) denote the execution probability of a FTs limit
order with bid price B conditional on the next trader being of type k 2 fST; FTg and the asset
value innovation being "t+1 2 f+; g. Then a FTs objective function can be written as
V LOt;FT = max
Bt;FT ;B
+
t;FT ;B
 
t;FT2B
8><>:
qjFT (Bt;FT )(vt + EEx["t+1] + L Bt;FT )
+(1  )qjST;+ (B+t;FT )(vt +  + L B+t;FT )
+(1  )qjST;  (B t;FT )(vt    + L B t;FT )
9>=>; (5)
It is easy to see that our assumption on FTsability to revise their limit orders implies that
B+t;FT and B
 
t;FT are set in perfect knowledge about both the next traders type and the realization
of "t+1. Hence they must be optimally chosen to be equal to a STs cuto¤ price at t+ 1.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, FTsrevised bid quotes are given by
B t;FT = B^

ST (vt   ) and B+t;FT = B^ST (vt + ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Moreover, the initial quote Bt;FT is de-facto only accessible to FTs which implies that we must
have Bt;FT 2 B0 =
n
B^FT (vt   ); B^FT (vt + )
o
. Hence we can rewrite a FTs objective function
as
V LOt;FT = max
Bt;FT2B0

qjFT (Bt;FT )(vt + EEx["t+1] + L Bt;FT )
	
(6)
where
qjFT (B) =
8><>:
0
1
4
1
2
if B < B^FT (vt   )
if B^FT (vt   )  B < B^FT (vt + )
if B^FT (vt + )  B
(7)
As in Foucault (1999) and Colliard and Foucault (2012), we focus on stationary Markov-perfect
equilibria, which is natural because tradersprots do not depend on the history of the game but
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only on the state of the market upon their arrival. The equilibrium is found by simultaneously
solving equations (2), (4) and (6) under the condition that the ordering of cuto¤ prices used for
obtaining the execution probability p(B) is satised. The following Lemma states that there is a
unique ordering of sellerscuto¤ prices in equilibrium, which signicantly facilitates its computation.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, B^ST (vt   )  B^FT (vt   )  B^ST (vt + )  B^FT (vt + )
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 implies (via equation (2)) that the endogenous outside option of posting limit orders is
more valuable for FTs than for STs, which is natural given their ability to revise their limit orders
conditional on the arrival of a ST in the next period. Additionally, the advantage of being fast is
directly related to the severity of the picking o¤ risk, , and therefore ensures a unique ordering.
Importantly, in the limit when  ! 0, being fast is not benecial anymore because limit orders are
no further exposed to the risk of being picked o¤.
3 Equilibrium
As in Colliard and Foucault (2012), it is straightforward to categorize agents strategies by their
respective limit order execution probabilities. Let pjk;"t+1 (B) denote the execution probability of
a STs limit order with bid price B conditional the type of the next trader and the asset value
innovation. We say that a ST uses a high ll-rate strategy if his quote has a strictly positive
execution probability for each possible realization of "t+1, that is pj"t+1 (B

ST ) > 0 for all "t+1.
Otherwise the strategy is said to have a low ll-rate. FTsinitial quotes BFT are categorized into a
low ll-rate and a high ll-rate strategy in exactly the same fashion. Moreover, we say that a ST uses
a specialized strategy if pjFT;"t+1 (B

ST ) 6= pjST;"t+1 (BST ) for some "t+1 2 f+; g, that is the limit
order is not attracting an execution from both types of agents for at least one possible realization
of "t+1. Notice that because FTs de facto face a binary choice, there is no need to categorize their
strategies further. Equipped with this typology of strategies, we can now state the following.
Proposition 1 For xed parameters (; ; L), there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in
the limit order market. In equilibrium
a) STs use a high ll-rate strategy for  < ST () and a low ll-rate strategy otherwise.
b) STs use a specialized strategy for  < S() and an unspecialized strategy otherwise.
c) FTs use a high ll-rate strategy for  < FT () and a low ll-rate strategy otherwise.
The denitions of FT (), 

ST () and 

S() are provided in the Appendix.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
It is straightforward to interpret Proposition 1 in the light of a trade-o¤ between execution
probability and expected prot conditional on execution. In line with Foucault (1999), parts a) and
c) state that a high (low) level of volatility induces agents to post limit orders with a low (high)
execution probability. Intuitively, larger innovations imply a more severe adverse selection risk for
a limit order trader, and the natural reaction is then to protect himself from unfavourable price
movements by posting less aggressive limit orders. Part b) is similarly intuitive: For a low level of
, it is not very attractive for STs to target FTs with their limit orders because this leads only to a
small increase in execution probabilities but requires considerably more aggressive quotes (due to a
more valuable outside option). Hence they only use an unspecialized strategy when  is su¢ ciently
large and otherwise partially shade their orders.
Figure 1 in the Appendix depicts the functions FT (), 

ST () and 

S() in the (; )-space,
where we have set L = 1 (this is without loss of generality as only the ratio of  and L is relevant).
One can see that we have FT () = 

ST () for   S() and FT () < ST () otherwise, which
implies that there are 5 distinct types of equilibria in total. To see why this is the case, rst consider
the situation where  > S() such that it is optimal for STs to use an unspecialized strategy. It
is easy to see that in this case both STs and FTs face the same choices, which is to pick a bid
quote from the restricted set B0 =
n
B^FT (vt   ); B^FT (vt + )
o
. Hence both types of traders use
the same strategy, and accordingly there are two types of equilibria (one with a high ll-rate and
another one with a low ll-rate). On the other hand, STs optimally use a specialized strategy for
 < S(), which implies that both types of traders face di¤erent choices (FTs choose from B0, STs
choose from B00 =
n
B^ST (vt   ); B^ST (vt + )
o
) and consequently the level of  for which they are
indi¤erent between a high ll-rate and a low ll-rate strategy does not coincide such that we have
three di¤erent types of equilibria for  < S(). One may show that 

FT () < 

ST () directly
follows from the fact that B^FT (vt) > B^

ST (vt).
The main goal of our analysis is to examine how trading speed a¤ects the order ow, trading
prots, and welfare by comparing equilibrium outcomes arising from parameters (; ; L), where  >
0, with those arising in the absence of FTs, i.e the equilibrium outcomes for (0; ; L). Unfortunately,
the fact that " is assumed to be both discrete and bounded (which is necessary to obtain a closed-
form solution) complicates this endeavour slightly because it restricts traders to choose between a low
and a high ll-rate and thus gives rise to bang-bang solutions. If agents are close to being indi¤erent
between those two strategies, a slight change in  can lead to a sharp change in the equilibrium
execution probability of limit orders and thereby induce a move from one extreme outcome (low
trade) to another (high trade). In order to avoid complications stemming from these discontinuities,
we will frequently assume that  is not "too close" to the level where STs are indi¤erent between
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a high ll-rate and a low ll-rate strategy in the absence of FTs, such that a change in  cannot
trigger a switch from an equilibrium with little trade to an equilibrium with a lot of trade or vice
versa. In order to formalize this assumption, we dene   min FT () and   max ST () and
make the following assumption throughout the remainder of the paper
Assumption 1 (technical)  2    [  where  = [0; ) and  = [;1).
Figure 1 also depicts the excluded interval [; ) in the (; )-space. As can be seen, this
assumption e¤ectively rules out the equilibrium where STs use a specialized high ll-rate strategy
and FTs use a low ll-rate strategy, such that we are left with 4 distinct types of equilibria. While
this may seem restrictive at rst glance, it turns out that this equilibrium is very similar to the
equilibrium where STs follow the same strategy but FTs choose a high ll-rate strategy instead; as
there are very few FTs in either case ( < S()), the di¤erence between both equilibria is of second
order. In the following, we refer to the di¤erent types of equilibria by the strategy chosen by STs
for parsimony. We abbreviate the unspecialized low (high) ll-rate equilibrium as ULFR (UHFR)
and the specialized low (high) ll-rate equilibrium as SLFR (SHFR). While only a subset of our
results relies on Assumption 1, we retain it throughout the text as it additionally helps to simplify
the exposition.7
4 Trading prots and the order ow
4.1 The outside option
The limit order market analyzed here can be seen as a sequential bargaining game over a total
surplus of 2L, where one agent posts a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (a limit order) to the next agent, who
then can either accept this o¤er (via a market order) or instead make another o¤er (via limit order)
to the agent arriving one period later. As usual in these situations, each agents bargaining power
is then determined by the size of his outside option. Now because FTs face a reduced risk of being
picked o¤ due to their ability to cancel some of their limit orders, the alternative of posting a limit
order is more valuable to them than to STs (see Lemma 2). This directly implies that they are able
to extract a higher share of the total surplus at the expense of STs, whose outside option value,
V LOST , accordingly deteriorates compared to the situation without fast agents (denoted by V
LO
0 ,
with associated limit order execution probability p0)
8 .
7 In order to verify that Assumption 1 does not distort the major economic tradeo¤s in the model we alternatively
solve the model numerically under the assumption of normally distributed asset value innovations. The resulting
conclusions are qualitatively in line with those derived here in closed form.
8We henceforth adopt the convention that the subscript 0 denotes equilibrium quantities for  = 0.
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Corollary 1 FTs (STs) limit order prots are always above (below) those obtained by agents in
a market with only STs, that is we have V LOFT > V
LO
0 > V
LO
ST for all  2 (0; 1). Moreover, STs
submit limit orders with a lower execution probability than in the absence of FTs, i.e. p  p0 for
all  2 (0; 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
E¤ectively, the presence of FTs creates a dilemma for STs, which is best seen by starting from
the situation where all agents are slow (i.e.  = 0). Now an increase in  presents STs with two
possible choices: Either they keep the execution probability of their limit orders constant at p = p0
by targeting both STs and FTs (i.e. use an unspecialized strategy) at the expense of a higher bid
price, or alternatively they accept a lower execution probability p < p0 by posting limit orders
that are at least in some cases only accepted by STs (a specialized strategy). It turns out that in
either case, they are worse o¤ compared to the situation without FTs. The above Corollary o¤ers
an interesting empirical implication: The proliferation of HFT leads slower market participants to
submit limit orders with a lower execution probability. To our knowledge, this prediction has not
been tested in the literature so far.
In order to gain some more intuition, it is instructive to examine how FTsadvantage at posting
limit orders,   V LOFT   V LOST , varies with  and . Clearly, in this model the value of being
fast directly derives from avoiding the winners curse, and therefore it comes at no surprise that 
is increasing in  for all . However, the relationship between  and  is slightly more complex.
First, it is easy to see that an increase in  raises the exposure of FTslimit orders to the risk of
being picked o¤ as they can only revise their quotes when interacting with STs. Hence we have
@V LOFT =@ < 0 for all . Now consider what happens to STsoutside option as the proportion of
FTs in the market increases. On the one hand, a larger  increases the likelihood to interact with
a market participant that has a higher bargaining power, which lowers V LOST as a higher share of
the surplus 2L is ceded to the trading counterparty on average. On the other hand, an increase in
 simultaneously hurts the protability of FTslimit orders and therefore in turn also benets STs.
Because the rst (second) e¤ect dominates if  is su¢ ciently small (large), V LOST is rst decreasing
and then increasing in . As a result,  may actually be increasing in  provided there are enough
STs in the market. A su¢ cient condition for this is that V LOFT does not decrease too quickly in ,
which is the case when the risk of being picked o¤ is not too severe, i.e. if  is su¢ ciently small.
Corollary 2  is increasing in  for all  2 (0; 1). Moreover, there exists a threshold ~ such that
 is decreasing in  for all  2 (0; 1) and  > ~ .
Proof. See the Appendix.
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4.2 The order ow
We next turn to the analysis of the order ow composition, i.e. the equilibrium mix between limit
and market orders. Consider the following four mutually exclusive events that may occur on the
equilibrium path. The arriving agent can be 1) a ST submitting a limit order, 2) a ST submitting
a market order, 3) a FT submitting a limit order, or 4) a FT submitting a market order. Now let
' = ('LOST ; '
MO
ST ; '
LO
FT ; '
MO
FT ) denote the stationary probability distribution of the above market
events in equilibrium, where we naturally have 'LOST +'
MO
ST = 1  and 'LOFT +'MOFT = . Then
one can show the following.
Proposition 2 The stationary probability distribution of equilibrium events is given by
'LOST =
1  

[1  (1
2
  qjFT )]
'MOST =
1  

[  1 + (1
2
  qjFT )]
'LOFT =


[1 + (1  )(pjST   pjFT )]
'MOFT =


[  1  (1  )(pjST   pjFT )]
where  = (1 + qjFT )(1 + (1  )pjST )  (1 )2 pjFT
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given this probability distribution, we may dene the trading rate (or per-period expected trad-
ing volume) as the unconditional probability of observing a trade in a given period, that is
TR  'MOST + 'MOFT (8)
Similarly one can dene the trader type-specic trading rates as TRST  'MOST =(1 ) and TRFT 
'MOFT =. In comparison to a market that is solely populated by STs, the existence of FTs a¤ects
the trading rate in two distinct ways.
First, FTs ability to revise their limit orders when trading with STs can help to reduce the
ine¢ ciency that is rooted in the adverse selection problem faced by limit orders. To see this, begin
by considering the case where all agents are slow and suppose that  2 . In this situation it is
optimal for agents to submit limit orders with a low ll-rate (execution probability equal to 1=4)
because the risk of being picked o¤ is too severe. This implies that some potential gains between
buyers and sellers are not realized because limit order traders post cautious quotes in an e¤ort to
protect themselves against adverse price movements. Now compare this with the case where some,
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but not all, traders are fast (i.e. 0 <  < 1). Because FTs may revise their limit orders after the
materialization of new information conditional on a ST arriving in the next period, the winners
curse is eliminated in these situations and more gains from trade can be reaped. Importantly, this
e¢ ciency gain diminishes as  approaches unity because being fast allows to avoid being picked o¤
only when facing slow traders.
Second, the presence of FTs negatively a¤ects STsoutside option (see Corollary 1). As discussed
in Section 3.1, the latter may react to this loss in bargaining power by either i) stepping up the
aggressiveness of their quotes (thus maintaining a constant probability of execution) or ii) accepting
a lower execution probability. While their expected prots decline in either case, the second choice
(which is optimal for  < S()) introduces an ine¢ ciency by reducing the likelihood that the total
surplus of 2L is shared. In contrast, the rst option only a¤ects the way the surplus is shared.
Now the total impact of having FTs in the market on the trading rate depends on which of the
two e¤ects dominates. It is easy to see that the rst e¤ect is absent for  2  because in this case 
is su¢ ciently low to induce traders to submit limit orders with a high execution probability. Hence
there is no ine¢ ciency to begin with and as a consequence the presence of FTs implies a drop in the
trading rate if  is su¢ ciently low to induce STs to use a specialized strategy. Conversely, a high
level of volatility, , leads the rst e¤ect to dominate and thus allows more gains from trade to be
realized.
Corollary 3 The presence of FTs increases trading volume except in a specialized high ll-rate
(SHFR) equilibrium, i.e. TR < TR0 for  2  and  < S() and TR  TR0 otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
There are several other papers that make predictions about the impact of high-frequency trading
on trading volume. Biais et al. (2012) develop a model where FTs are more likely to locate trading
opportunities (which raises trading volume) but at the same time possess private information and
therefore create adverse selection (which reduces trading volume). Focussing on the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium, they show that a su¢ ciently large proportion of FTs can reduce trade in comparison
to a market with only STs. In the present model, on the other side, only a su¢ ciently small level
of  leads to a decrease in trading volume as it induces STs to submit limit orders with a lower
execution probability. For  su¢ ciently large, trading volume always increaes compared to the case
where  = 0. Similarly, Jovanovich and Menkveld (2012) present a model where the introduction of
competitive HFT middlemen can have either a positive or a negative e¤ect on trading volume in a
limit order market. While greater speed allows intermediaries to avoid the winners curse (similar in
spirit to this paper), HFTs ability to process (hard) information quickly (e.g. real-time datafeeds on
index futures) introduces an additional adverse selection problem that did not a¤ect trade in their
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absence. The associated empirical evidence based on HFT entry into the market for Dutch equities
is mixed as it led to an increase in trade frequency, but a reduction in trading volume. Cartea and
Penalva (2012) suggest that HFT increases trading volume mechanically because more and more
trades get intermediated. While the accelerated increase in trading volume over the past decades
(see e.g. Chordia et a. (2011)) has bee accompanied by the advent of HFT, more empirical work
based on natural experiments is needed to establish causality.
Besides the trading rate, the stationary probability distribution of market events, ', allows us
to analyze how the presence of FTs a¤ects the equilibrium mix of limit and market orders. This is
particularly relevant because up to date there is little theoretical work that connects high-frequency
trading to specic properties of the order ow, but at the same time the availability of detailed data
has already allowed empirical researchers to examine this relationship to some extent, as discussed
further below.
To this end, we dene the limit-to-market order ratio, LtM, as the average number of limit
orders per period divided by the average number of market orders. Taking care of the fact that FTs
revise their limit orders in case they are followed by a ST (i.e. with probability (1  )), we have
LtM =
'LOST + '
LO
FT (2  )
'MOST + '
MO
FT
=
'MOST
'MOST + '
MO
FT
LtMST +
'MOFT
'MOST + '
MO
FT
LtMFT
where LtMST = '
LO
ST ='
MO
ST and LtM

FT = (2   )'LOFT ='MOFT denote the trader type-specic
ratios.
Corollary 4 We have LtMFT > LtM

ST and LtM
 > LtM0 for all  2 (0; 1). Moreover, LtM
and LtMFT are increasing in  for all  2 (0; 1). If  > max S(), then LtMST is increasing in
 for   (p41  5)=2 and decreasing in  otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The fact that FTs display a higher limit-to-market order ratio than STs comes at no surprise.
Because of their higher outside option, FTs will reject some quotes that STs nd acceptable and are
hence more likely to submit limit orders. Moreover, their ability to revise some of their outstanding
limit orders further increases LtMFT . While there are relatively few empirical studies that are able
to trace the order submission strategies of individual traders, the existing evidence is consistent
with the above prediction. Hagströmer and Norden (2013) examine trading in Swedish stocks and
document that that HFTs display a order-to-trade ratio that is roughly 5 times as large as that
of nonHFT. Similarly in spirit, Malinova et al. (2012) nd that HFTs generate around 80% of all
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messages but are only involved in 25% of all trades in a dataset containing detailed message tra¢ c
from the Toronto Stock Exchange. We also nd that the aggregate limit-to-market order ratio is
higher with FTs than without them. Even though FTs may enable more trades to occur, this is due
to their ability to revise limit orders such that in sum LtM > LtM0 . This is consistent with the
the enourmous growth in message tra¢ c in electronic markets as documented e.g. in Hendershott
et al. (2011).
Because an increase in volatility implies a higher risk of adverse selection, agents protect them-
selves against the winners curse by posting limit orders with lower execution probabilities, which
in turn lowers (increases) the chance of observing a market (limit) order. While this intuition holds
for LtM and LtMFT , we nd that LtM

ST may actually be decreasing in  if there are su¢ ciently
many FTs in the market. In order to see the intuition behind this result, suppose that  is very close
to unity. This implies that most limit orders stem from FTs, and therefore a slow seller will accept
virtually every buy limit order he encounters when arriving at the market. Hence any variation in
LtMST is mainly driven by the likelihood of nding a non-empty limit order book. It is easy to see
that the chance of encountering a trading opportunity must be higher in a low ll-rate equilibrium
because FTs are more likely to submit limit orders and therefore LtMST is decreasing in  if  is
su¢ ciently large.
While the LtM ratios are concerned with pure order submissions, many limit orders do ultimately
not result in trades. Therefore it is interesting to restrict the analysis to actual trades in order to
examine whether a particular trader type is more likely to act as a maker (i.e. liquidity provider)
or as a taker (i.e. liquidity consumer). Hence we dene the make-take ratio as the probability of
trading via a limit order divided by the probability of trading via a market order (for a given trader
type), that is
MT k =
!k;ST + !

k;FT
!ST;k + !

FT;k
where !k;j denotes the equilibrium probability of observing a trade that is due to a market order
from a type-j trader executing against the limit order from a type-k trader, with j; k 2 fST; FTg.
Because transactions between two traders of the same type are neutral for this breakdown, it is easy
to see that we have MT FT  1  MT ST if and only if !FT;ST  !ST;FT , i.e. a FT (ST) will only
display a make-take ratio of more (less) than 1 if he is more (less) likely to supply liquidity to STs
(FTs) than to consume liquidity from them.
It turns out that this condition is always satised, which is the combined result of two e¤ects.
First, FTs enjoy the maximal limit order execution probability of 1=2 conditional on the arrival of a
ST as their ability to revise quotes in the light of new information has eliminated the winners curse.
Second, FTs are less likely than STs to submit market orders when arriving to the market because
some quotes that a ST nds worth accepting may be rejected by a FT (due to his higher outside
option). This is easily veried by looking at the stationary probability distribution in Proposition
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2.
Corollary 5 FTs are always more likely to trade via limit order than STs, that is we have MT FT 
1 MT ST for all  2 (0; 1). Moreover, MTST is decreasing in  and MTFT is increasing in  for
all  2 (0; 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The prediction that FTs are more likely to act as takers than as makers mirrors the fact that most
of the well-known HFT rms (e.g. Getco, Knight, Citadel, Optiver, etc.) are engaged in substantial
market making activities. Moreover it is roughly consistent with the empirical evidence available so
far. Menkveld (2012) studies a large HFT that takes part in almost 15% of all transactions in Dutch
stocks traded on Euronext and Chi-X and trades via limit order roughly 80% of the time. Similarly,
Hagströmer and Norden (2013) and Malinova et al. (2012) provide evidence that is consistent with
HFT mainly acting as makers in Swedish and Canadian equities, respectively. Chaboud et al. (2012)
study trading in three di¤erent FX pairs and nd that in the two most liquid pairs (EUR/USD and
JPY/USD) humans are more likely to consume liquidity from computers than vice versa. This
result does not obtain for the third pair (JPY/EUR), which is likely due to the fact that most of
these trades are aimed at exploiting triangular arbitrage opportunities. Contrary to all these papers,
Hendershott et al. (2012) document that HFTs are more likely to be takers in a sample of Nasdaq
stocks.
The intuition behind MT k s dependence on  is straightforward. While an increase in volatility
induces traders to submit less aggressive limit orders, FTse¤ectively only change their strategy
towards other FTs while continuing to provide liquidity to STs for both possible realizations of
" (see Lemma 1). Hence a higher level of  increases the relative odds of FTs being makers and
conversely reduces the chances of STs trading passively. To our knowledge, this is a novel empirical
implication of our model that has not yet been tested in the literature.
4.3 Market orders
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium prots obtained from posting market orders, which
we denote VMOk for k 2 fST; FTg. Recalling the LHS of inequality (1), we may write
VMOk = L  E(k) (9)
where we follow Foucault (1999) in dening a sellers trading cost as the discount he cedes to the
limit order buyer with respect to the assets fair value, that is
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k = vt  Bmt
It is important to note that the trading cost crucially depends on both the type of the market order
trader and the limit order trader whose quote is executed as well as on the most recent realization
of the asset value innovation. Hence the expectation E(k) above is taken jointly over all possible
states for both vt and Bmt . Now let 
"
j;k denote the trading cost incurred by a type-k seller that
executes the bid quote of a type-j buyer conditional on the most recent realization of ", where
j; k 2 fST; FTg, and let !"j;k be the associated probability of this event in equilibrium conditional
on ". Then, the equilibrium expected trading cost for a type-k trader is given by
E(k) =
! ST;k
 
ST;k + !
+
ST;k
+
ST;k + !
 
FT;k
 
FT;k + !
+
FT;k
+
FT;k
!+ST;k + !
 
ST;k + !
+
FT;k + !
 
FT;k
(10)
Finally, we may also consider the expected trading cost of the average transaction, which can be
computed as as a linear combination of E(ST ) and E(

FT ), where the weights are given by the
respective share in the overall trading rate
E() =
'MOST
'MOST + '
MO
FT
E(ST ) +
'MOFT
'MOST + '
MO
FT
E(FT ) (11)
At this point it is useful to recall (see inequality (1)) that market orders are only submitted in
case they o¤er a payo¤which at least matches the expected prot that can be obtained by posting a
limit order instead, i.e. we have VMOk  V LOk . Particularly protable trading opportunities arise
in the case where the asset value moves "against" the limit order trader, which allows the market
order trader to pick o¤ an extra windfall prot of 2 on top of his outside option value. Notice that
these situations can only arise when limit orders are su¢ ciently aggressive such that they may be
executed for either realization of ".
With this in mind, it is easy to see how the presence of FTs can lead to an increase in E(ST )
relative to the case where all agents are slow. Because FTs may revise their orders when being
followed by STs, the latter now face a decreased likelihood of enjoying additional "picking o¤"-prots.
In fact, Lemma 1 states that STs just obtain their outside option value V LOST when trading against
the limit orders of FTs, which implies (Corollary 1) that the costs incurred for these transactions are
higher than those prevailing in a market with only STs (henceforth denoted E(0)). Importantly,
this is true even in the case where agents use low ll-rate strategies and market orders do not
enjoy the above benets arising from the winners curse. The reason behind this is that FTsspeed
advantage additionally enables them to discriminate between trader types.9 To see this, consider
a FT submitting a buy limit order at time t and suppose that  is su¢ ciently high such that he
9Notice that it is not protable to discriminate between di¤erent types of traders for  = 0 because in this case
all agents have the same outside option.
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initially posts BFT = B^FT (vt   ). Now consider what happens if the asset value decreases prior
to the arrival of a seller in the next period, i.e. "t+1 =  . If the following trader is fast, he
will submit a market order and and thus obtains a prot of B^FT (vt   )   (vt      L) = V LOFT ,
which is just his outside option. Now if the following trader is slow, the fast limit order trader
still has an incentive to revise his quote downwards despite having ruled out the winners curse
ex-ante, because STs have a lower outside option and are therefore willing to accept a prot of
B^ST (vt   )  (vt      L) = V LOST < V LOFT instead.
Unlike STs, FTs do not loose protable trading opportunities and therefore it is easy to see that
we must have E(FT ) < E(

ST ). Moreover, because their outside option value V
LO
FT exceeds V
LO
0 ,
their trading costs are in fact below those prevailing in a market with only STs. The following
Corollary summarizes.
Corollary 6 E(FT ) < E(

ST ) and E(

FT ) < E(

0) for all  2 (0; 1). Moreover, if  2 [8=15; )
then E(ST ) > E(
) > E(0) for all  2 (0; 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The fact that we do not observe an increase in STs expected trading costs across the entire
parameter space is once again due to the specic distributional assumption concerning the asset
value innovations. In fact, because " is discrete, STs increase the execution probability of their limit
order conditional on the arrival of a FT without increasing the likelihood that the order is executed
by a ST when switching from a specialized to an unspecialized strategy. This implies that they
o¤er a higher bid price to slow sellers without actually improving the chances of having their limit
order lled by them, and the resulting discrete drop in the cost of trading with other STs can cause
E(ST ) (and eventually also E(
)) to drop below E(0) for intermediate values of .
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There is overwhelming empirical evidence that is consistent with the view that being slow (fast)
leads to trading at less (more) favourable prices. Hasbrouck & Saar (2009) document that the
"lifetimes" of limit orders have decreased considerably over the past years, which suggests that an
increasingly large fraction of limit orders is in fact not accessible for market participants that are
not able to react su¢ ciently fast to quote updates. In fact, several exchanges (e.g. Direct Edge,
Bats, and Nasdaq) have at least temporarily facilitated price discrimination via trading speed by
introducing so-called "ash orders" (see Skjeltorp et al. (2011) for details), a practice that has
been banned by the SEC in the meantime. Garvey and Wu (2010) provide more direct evidence
by showing that geographical distance to the market center is negatively related to execution speed
and positively related to transactions costs. Hendershott and Riordan (2012) study transactions
data from the German Stock Exchange and nd that "algorithmic traders consume liquidity when
10Solving the model numericall for normally distributed innovations yields E(ST ) > E(
) > E(0) for all para-
meters.
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it is cheap" in the sense that they pay lower e¤ective spreads than slower human traders. In line
with this, Moallemi and Saglam (2011) develop a model of the "cost of latency" and estimate that
it has increased threefold in the period 1995-2005. Finally, McInish and Upson (2012) study the
Benchmark Quote exception to the Order Protection Rule and provide evidence that is consistent
with FTs exploiting their speed advantage at the expense of STs.
Several empirical papers (see e.g. Hendershott et al. (2011), Boehmer et al. (2012), and Has-
brouck and Saar (2012)) have documented a negative relationship between algorithmic trading and
traditional measures of market liquidity (e.g. quoted and e¤ective spreads). While some of these
studies also provide evidence for a causal e¤ect, it is di¢ cult to distentangle the e¤ect of trading
speed (i.e. HFT) from other features of algorithmic trading (e.g. improved search and trade ex-
ecution), the removal of competitive barriers in terms of liquidity provision, decimalization, and
inter-market competition. Therefore these ndings are not necessarily at odds with the implication
of Corollary 6 that high-frequency trading leads to an increase in trading costs. Additionally, it is
important to stress that our measure of trading costs merely reects the distribution of bargaining
power between limit and market order traders, which is not necessarily in line with the more tra-
ditional notion of the "cost of immediacy" payable to an intermediary. In fact, trading costs can
be negative in our model (as e.g. in Goettler et al. (2009)) because we may have Bmt > vt, while
most empirical measures assume that the midquote is equal to the true value and hence Bmt < vt
by assumption.
5 Welfare
So far, we have taken the proportion of FTs as exogenous. While this is helps to learn about the
e¤ect of HFT in a limit order market in general, a rigorous evaluation of the associated welfare
e¤ects demands that  is determined endogenously. In order to do so, we assume (as is customary in
the literature on information acquisition, see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) that all agents are
born slow but prior to entering the market have the opportunity to become fast at an exogenously
given cost c > 0. Now let W ST () and W

FT () denote the equilibrium expected trading prots for
STs and FTs, respectively, as a function of . Then, an interior equilibrium requires that the prots
of STs are equal to those of FTs net of the cost for becoming fast, that is
W () W FT () W ST () = c (12)
Obviously, corner equilibria may arise either because the cost c is prohibitively high, i.e.
max

W () < c
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in which case all agents choose to remain slow,  = 0, or because the incremental benet of
being fast is high enough to justify the cost for any level of  (hence  = 1), which is the case i¤
min

W () > c
Using the results from the previous sections, the expected equilibrium trading prots for each
trader type can easily be calculated as a weighted average of the prots obtained via each order type
W ST =
'LOST
'LOST + '
MO
ST
V LOST +
'MOST
'LOST + '
MO
ST
VMOST (13)
W FT =
'LOFT
'LOFT + '
MO
FT
V LOFT +
'MOFT
'LOFT + '
MO
FT
VMOFT (14)
Then, emphasizing the dependence of all equilibrium outcomes on , equilibrium welfare is given
by
W () = (1  )W ST () + (W FT ()  c) (15)
= TR() (2L)  c
Note that an equilibrium may fail to exist becauseW () is not continuous in  (due to the discrete
change when moving from one type of equilibrium to another). Additionally, an interior equilibrium
need not be unique because there may be several values of  that satisfy equation W () = c
for xed (; L; c). Straightforward computations reveal that STs are always worse o¤ than in the
absence of FTs. Hence equation (12) directly implies the following.
Corollary 7 Suppose that the parameters (; L; c) are such that an equilibrium with endogenous
investment in HFT exists. Then, any positive equilibrium level of investment  > 0 exceeds the
socially optimal level of investment + and moreover yields a social welfare loss, that is we have
W () < W (0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
As in Biais et al. (2012), the equilibrium level of investment into HFT is excessive from a social
point of view because FTs exert a negative externality on STs. Yet, the nature of these externalities
are quite di¤erent from each other. In Biais et al. (2012), FTs are a source of adverse selection
because their speed allows them to act swiftly on new information. As is customary, this induces
dealers to widen the bid-ask spread payable by everyone and consequently implies a welfare loss to
STs. Here, FTs are not a source of adverse selection but instead have the potential to avoid adverse
selection. Yet, because agents trade directly with each other in a dynamic setting, the ability to
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avoid the winners curse increases their bargaining power relative to STs and consequently leaves
the latter with a smaller share of the surplus 2L. Additionally, market orders become less protable
for STs because they can no longer pick o¤ FTs.
It is important to stress that Corollary 7 does not imply that  = 0 is socially optimal. In fact,
Corollary 3 shows that the presence of some FTs allows more gains from trade to be realized for
 2 , which implies that implies that some investment in HFT can be optimal for c su¢ ciently
small. For the purpose of illustration, consider the following numerical example. Suppose that  =
L = 1 and c = 0:1. Then straightforward calculations reveal that the socially optimal proportion of
FTs is equal to + = 0:347, which is strictly positive. Compared to the case without FTs, welfare
increases by more than 10% from W (0) = 0:4 to W (+) = 0:446. In line with Corollary 7, the
equilibrium level of HFT is considerably higher at  = 0:759 and implies a welfare loss of close to 5%
(W () = 0:383). Finally, it is worth stressing that it can never be optimal to have a market with
only FTs, because in this case the equilibrium that obtains is exactly identical to the one with only
slow traders with the di¤erence that all agents have spent c to become fast. In contrast,  = 1 may
be optimal in Biais et al. (2012) if STs are su¢ ciently ine¢ cient in nding trading opportunities.
Because FTs are the source of a negative externality, there is scope for regulatory intervention.
Among the numerous suggestions that have been tabled in the public debate are minimum rest-
ing times for limit orders and restrictions concerning the number of electronic messages individual
market participants may send. But it is precisely FTsability to revise outstanding limit orders in-
stantaneously that is the source of an important e¢ ciency gain, and therefore it is socially desirable
to implement a regulation that improves upon the market outcome but at the same time attempts to
reap some of the benets that HFT may bring along. Any direct form of taxation on HFT activity
would in principle be suited to fulll this objective.
One salient feature of our model which is at odds with reality is that limit orders are always
submitted with the aim of being executed. In reality, this is clearly not the case as some market
participants try to slow down others by submitting a large number of limit orders deep in the book.
This practice, called "quote stu¢ ng"11 , and other related strategies may be responsible for a large
share of the total growth in message tra¢ c over the past 5-10 years that has become a burden on
both market regulators and exchanges alike. While several market centers (e.g. Nasdaq, Euronext,
Deutsche Börse, etc.) have started to ne users for excessive system usage, there is little attempt
to discriminate those that want to trade from those that aim to disrupt markets and benet at the
expense of others. One notable exception is the policy adopted in early 2011 by the Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE), which only penalizes message tra¢ c beyond the best quote.12 Such a weighting
may be a sensible way to curb the excessive submission of limit orders without loosing the potential
benets of HFT.
11 see Financial Times, "High-frequency trading: Up against a bandsaw", September 2, 2010
12 see http://ir.theice.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=652686
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Another question is whether there are other ways of reaching the e¢ ciency gain from avoiding
the winners curse without su¤ering from the negative externalities of HFT. One potential solution
could be the use of "pegged" limit orders, i.e. orders whose limit price is indexed to the fundamental
value of the underlying asset. While welfare would be maximal in this case, it would obviously be
di¢ cult to observe vt in practice.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ongoing controversy on the pros and cons of HFT by presenting a
stylized model of trading in a limit order market where investors di¤er in their trading speed. We
show that HFT may allow more gains from trade to be realized because being fast reduces the risk
of being "picked o¤" and thus eliminates the need for posting cautious limit orders. Yet, at the
same time, slow market participants su¤er from a worse bargaining position and this may lead them
to submit limit orders with a lower execution probability and therefore reduce trade. This negative
externality ensures that there is too much investment in HFT in equilibrium. We additionally show
how the presence of FTs a¤ects the order ow and develop several testable implications, some novel
and others that are consistent with the existing literature.
While our model conrms the view held by policy makers that HFT should be regulated, our
analysis suggests that some of the proposed measures such as minimum order resting times or
undi¤erentiated limits to message tra¢ c would deprive society of some potential gains.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a FT that has placed a bid at time t. If he observes the innovation "t+1 and can still
modify his order, he knows that the next agent (provided he is a seller) is a ST with sell cuto¤ price
B^ST (vt+"t+1). Clearly, this is the optimal bid price since a lower (higher) bid has a zero (the same)
execution probability. 
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that, in equilibrium, a ST posts a buy limit order that executes only if the asset value
decreases. Then, a FT can always do better by posting the same bid price and revise his order
according to Lemma 1 in case the asset value increases and the next trader is a ST. Similarly, if a
ST posts a limit order that executes irrespectively of the asset value innovation, a FT can do better
by revising his order according to Lemma 1 and obtaining higher prots by incorporating the latest
innovation into his limit price whenever possible (i.e. when a ST follows). Hence we conclude that
V LOFT > V
LO
ST , and equation (2) then implies that B^

FT (vt) > B^

ST (vt).
It remains to show that B^FT (vt   )  B^ST (vt + ). First, notice that L is the expected total
gains from trade per period (if two agents with di¤erent private valuations trade they share a surplus
of 2L , but this occurs at most with probability 1=2) we must have L  V LOk  0 for k 2 fST; FTg.
Now suppose that   L=2. Using equation (2), we have vt +   B^ST (vt + )  vt +    L and
vt   B^FT (vt )  vt  L, which directly implies B^ST (vt +)  B^FT (vt ). Now assume
that  < L=2 and consider a fast buyer submitting a buy limit order. It is easy to see that in this case
we have 4 [v +L B^FT (vt+)]+ 4 [v++L B^FT (vt+)]  4 [v +L B^FT (vt )] such that
his optimal choice is BFT = B^

FT (vt+). Notice that a buyer arriving at t+1 will never execute this
order because v +L > B^FT (vt+), that is the bid price BFT is below his lowest possible valuation.
Now consider a slow buyer and suppose he posts a buy limit order with BST = B^

FT (vt+). As this
is not necessarily his equilibrium strategy we have that V LOST  12 [v+L  B^FT (vt+)]. But we just
concluded that V LOFT =

2 [v+L B^FT (vt+)]+ 1 4 [v +L B^ST (vt )]+ 1 4 [v++L B^ST (vt+
)], and therefore V LOFT  V LOST  1 4 [B^FT (vt+) B^ST (vt )]+ 1 4 [B^FT (vt+) B^ST (vt+)] =
1 
2 [B^

FT (vt)  B^ST (vt)] + 1 2 . Then, using equation (2), we obtain B^FT (vt)  B^ST (vt)  1 1+,
which lets us conclude B^ST (vt)  B^FT (vt) + 2 > 0 as desired. 
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Although Lemma 2 implies that the equilibrium sell cuto¤ prices for sellers always satisfy B^ST (vt 
)  B^FT (vt )  B^ST (vt +)  B^FT (vt +), there is no one-to-one mapping between quotation
strategies and limit order execution probabilities because one additionally needs to consider the
possibility that buyers submit sell market orders. While we have briey ruled this out in Subsection
X.X in order to simplify the exposition of agentsstrategies, it needs to be considered in nding an
equilibrium. Because Lemma 2 is essentially silent on the relative positioning of the equilibrium sell
cuto¤ prices of buyers, which we henceforth denote by Bk(vt+1), there are four distinct possibilities
for the joint ordering of buyersand sellersequilibrium sell cuto¤ prices:
Ordering 1: B^ST (vt )  B^FT (vt )  BST (vt )  BFT (vt )  B^ST (vt+)  B^FT (vt+) 
BST (vt + )  BFT (vt + )
Ordering 2: B^ST (vt )  B^FT (vt )  BST (vt )  B^ST (vt+)  BFT (vt )  B^FT (vt+) 
BST (vt + )  BFT (vt + )
Ordering 3: B^ST (vt )  B^FT (vt )  B^ST (vt+)  BST (vt )  B^FT (vt+)  BFT (vt ) 
BST (vt + )  BFT (vt + )
Ordering 4: B^ST (vt )  B^FT (vt )  B^ST (vt+)  B^FT (vt+)  BST (vt )  BFT (vt ) 
BST (vt + )  BFT (vt + )
In order to nd an equilibrium for xed parameters, we follow the following steps:
1) Conjecture an ordering of cuto¤ prices.
2) Conjecture equilibrium strategies and solve for the equilibrium cuto¤ prices.
3) Verify that
a) the assumed strategies are best replies (i.e. deviations are not protable) and
b) the cuto¤ prices satisfy the assumed ordering.
Type 1 equilibrium:
Case A:
Step 1: Assume Ordering 1.
Step 2: Assume BST = B^

ST (vt   ) and BFT = B^FT (vt   ) which implies that p = 1 4 and
qjFT =
1
4 . Using the the optimally revised FT quotes from Lemma 1 with conditional execution
probabilities qjST;+ = qjST;+ = 14 , the equilibrium expected prots from posting limit orders are
given by
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V LOST =
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
V LOFT =
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
+
1  
4
h
vt +  + L  B^ST (vt + )
i
+

4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt   )
i
Substituting V LOt;k = B^k(vt)   (vt   L) (equation (2)) one obtains a system of 2 equations in
2 unknowns that can be solved for the equilibrium cuto¤ prices B^ST (vt) = vt   L + (2L) 1 5  and
B^FT (vt) = vt   L+ (2L) 8 (3+)(5 )(4+) .
Step 3: Notice that it can never be optimal to choose a bid price equal to the sell cuto¤ price
of a buyer, as one can always fare strictly better by choosing the next lowest sell cuto¤ price of
a seller (thus avoiding the loss when trading with the buyer). Hence we must have B^ST 2 B and
B^FT 2 B0.Thus, the strategy conjectured for STs is a best reply i¤
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 1
4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt   )
i
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 1
2
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt + )
i
+
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt + )
i
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 1
2
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
+
1
4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
Similarly, fast buyers have no incentives to deviate i¤:

4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt   )
i
 
2
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
+

4
h
vt +  + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
Brute-force algebra reveals that these inequalities and the assumed ordering of cuto¤ prices are
satised if and only   p5  2 and   24+(1 )(5 )(4+)L.
Case B:
Step 1: Assume Ordering 2.
Step 2: Conjecture the same equilibrium strategies as in Case A, which implies identical cuto¤
prices.
Step 3: The proposed strategies are best replies (for buyers) i¤
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1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 1
4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt   )
i
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 2  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt + )
i
+
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt + )
i
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 1
2
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
+
1
4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i

4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt   )
i
 
2
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
+

4
h
vt +  + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
These inequalities together with the conjectured ordering of cuto¤ prices are satised i¤   p5  2
and 24+(1 )(5 )(4+)L >   L.
Case C:
Step 1: Assume Ordering 3.
Step 2: Conjecture the same equilibrium strategies as in Case A, which implies identical cuto¤
prices.
Step 3: The proposed strategies are best replies (for buyers) i¤
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 1
4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt   )
i
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 1
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt + )
i
+
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt + ))
i
1  
4
h
vt    + L  B^ST (vt   )
i
 2  
4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
+
1
4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt + )
i

4
h
vt    + L  B^FT (vt   ))
i
 
2
h
vt + L  B^FT (vt + )
i
These inequalities together with the conjectured ordering of cuto¤ prices are satised i¤   p5  2
and L >   L 45  . Combining Cases A, B and C, we conclude BST = B^ST (vt   ) and BFT =
B^FT (vt   ) and the associated order choice strategy constitute an equilibrium i¤  
p
5  2 and
  L 45  .
The proof for the remaining equilibrium types follows exactly the same logic, such that we
omit them for brevity. The following tables indicates the respective orderings that give rise to the
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individual equilibria together with the equilibrium strategies, cuto¤ prices, execution probabilities
and parameter conditions, where we use the following denitions: 1 
p
5   2, 2 
p
33 5
2 ,
1()  L 45  , 2()  L 2(1+)3 4 , 3()  L 4(4+)26 2 , 4()  L 2(1 )(4+)7+3 , and 5()  L 4(1+)7+3 .
Equilibrium Ordering BST B

FT p
 qjFT Condition  Condition 
1 (SLFR) 1-3 B^ST (vt   ) B^FT (vt   ) 1 4 14   1   1
2 (ULFR) 1-4 B^FT (vt   ) B^FT (vt   ) 14 14 1 <   2   4
2 <    5
3 3 & 4 B^ST (vt + ) B^

FT (vt   ) 2 4 14   1 1 >   3
1 <   2 4 >   3
4 (SHFR) 4 B^ST (vt + ) B^

FT (vt + )
2 
4
1
2   2 3 >   2
5 (UHFR) 4 B^FT (vt + ) B^

FT (vt + )
1
2
1
2   2 2() > 
 > 2 

5() > 
Equilibrium B^ST (vt) B^

FT (vt)
1 (SLFR) vt L+ (2L) 1 5  vt L+ (2L) 8 (3+)(5 )(4+)
2 (ULFR) vt L+ (2L) 1+7+3 vt L+ (2L) 3 7+3
3 vt L+ (2L) 2 6   26  vt L+ (2L) 8 (2+)(6 )(4+)+ 4(1 )(6 )(4+)
4 (SHFR) vt L+ (2L) 2 6   26  vt L+ (2L) 4+(2 )(6 )(2+)+ 2 (8 )(6 )(2+)
5 (UHFR) vt L+ (2L) 13  23(1+) vt L+ (2L) 13+ 1 33(1+)
Moreover, the functions ST (), 

FT () and 

S() are dened as
ST () 
8><>:
1()
4()
5()
if   1
if 1 <   2
if 2 < 
FT () 
(
3()
5()
if   2
if 2 < 
S() 
8><>:
1
 14 ()
 12 ()
if   1(1)
if 1(

1) >   3(2)
if 3(

2) > 
Finally, it is straightforward, albeit tedious to show that no other equilibria exist, which establishes
uniqueness. 
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7.4 Proof of Corollary 1
The result follows immediately from the cuto¤ prices and equilibrium execution probabilities com-
puted in the proof of Proposition 1, where V LO0 = lim
!0
V LOST and p

0 = lim
!0
p. 
7.5 Proof of Corollary 2
The table below collects  for each type of equilibrium, which is calculated directly by using the
cuto¤ prices obtained in the proof of Proposition 1.
Equilibrium 
SLFR (2L) 4(5 )(4+)
ULFR (2L) 2(1 )7+3
SHFR (2L) 2(6 )(2+) +
6 (6 )
(6 )(2+)
UHFR 1 1+
Now because  is continuous in both  and  it su¢ ces to perform comparative statics within
a xed type of equilibrium. From the table above it can easily be deduced that we have @=@  0
for all  2 (0; 1). Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that @=@ < 0 may only be violated in a
specialized high ll-rate equilibrium, where this condition boils down to  > 12+
2
48 18+2 (2L). Hence
for  to be decreasing in  for all  2 (0; 1) we require  > ~, where ~ ' 0:5788 is the solution to
the xed point problem  = 12+(
 1
2 ())
2
48 18 12 ()+( 12 ())2
(2L). 
7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
On the equilibrium path, the transitions from one state to another follow a Markov chain with
transition matrix
P  =
266664
(1  )(1  pjHT ) (1  )pjHT (1  pjAT ) pjAT
1   0  0
(1  ) 12 (1  ) 12 (1  qjFT ) qjFT
1   0  0
377775
As in Colliard and Foucault (2012), the stationary probability distribution ' = ('LOHT ; '
MO
HT ; '
LO
AT ; '
MO
AT )
is then simply given by the left eigenvalue of P . 
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7.7 Proof of Corollary 3
It is straightforward to compute the trading rates for each type of equilibrium by substituting the
respective execution probabilities from the proof of Proposition 1 into the formula for the stationary
probability distribution derived in Proposition 2. The following table collects the trading rates for
all types of equilibria.
Equilibrium TR
SLFR 4+(1 )(4+)(5 )
ULFR 4+3(1 )20 +2
SHFR 4 (1 )12+ 2
UHFR 13
Notice that TR0 = 1=3 for  2  and TR0 = 1=5 for  2 . The result follows immediately. 
7.8 Proof of Corollary 4
It directly follows from Proposition 2 that we have LtMFT > LtM

ST for all  2 (0; 1). As the limit-
to-market order ratios do not explicitly depend on , the remaining results require to compare the
relevant ratio across di¤erent types of equilibria. Under Assumption 1, increases in  given a xed
level of (;L) may lead to the following transitions: UHFR!SHFR, SHFR!SLFR, SHFR!ULFR,
and UHFR!ULFR. The LtM ratios for the di¤erent equilibria are easily calculated by substituting
the respective equilibrium execution probabilities from the proof of Proposition 1 into the stationary
probability distribution of Proposition 2 and contained in the following table.
Equilibrium LtMST LtM

FT LtM

SLFR 4(4 )4+5 2
4(2 )

16+4(5 )(1 )
4 (1 )
ULFR 4(4 )4+3+2
16(2 )
4 (1 ) 4
SHFR 84+ 2
2(5 )(2 )
2+(3 )
8+2(6 )(1 )
4 (1 )
UHFR 2 2(2  ) 2(1 + (1  ))
It is easy to see that any of the above transitions leads to an increase in the LtMFT and LtM

ratios. Clearly, for  > max S(), increases in  may only lead to a transition from a ULFR to a
UHFR equilibrium. Therefore it directly follows that LtMST is increasing in  for  < (
p
41  5)=2
and decreasing otherwise. 
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7.9 Proof of Corollary 5
First, we need to show that !FT;ST = '
LO
FT (1  a)qjST  'LOST pjFT = !ST;FT . Lemma 1 implies
that qjST = 1=2 and using the denition of the trader type-specic trading rates we can rewrite
this as (1   TRFT )  (1   TRST )2pjFT . Because 2pjFT  1, Proposition 2 then implies that this
inequality is always satised.
The following table collects MT ST and MT

FT for all equilibria.
Equilibrium MT ST MT

FT
SLFR 4 5+
2
4+5 2
2 

ULFR 4 4+3+2
8 4
4 +2
SHFR 4 24+ 2
20 4
8+12 42
UHFR 1 1
In order to show that MT FT (MT

ST ) is increasing (decreasing) in , we again simply require
that an equilibrium transition due to an increase in  yields an increase (decrease) in the ratio
(see the Proof of Corollary 5). It is easily veried that this is always the case such that the result
follows. 
7.10 Proof of Corollary 6
First, notice that for the assumed range of  two di¤erent types of equilibria may emerge (SHFR and
UHFR) and that we have E() = 13L  23 (see Foucault (1999)). Now consider the UHFR equilib-
rium, which can only arise if  > 1=3 = S(8=15). In this case we have '
 = ( 2(1 )3 ;
(1 )
3 ;
2
3 ;

3 ),
which implies that
!ST;k
!ST;k+!

FT;k
=
'MOST
'MOST +'
MO
FT
= (1 ). Using equations (9) and (??), it is straight-
forward to show that E(ST ) = (1 )(L V LOFT  )+(L V LOST ) = 13L  4 63(1+) and E(FT ) =
L V LOFT   = 13L  43(1+), from which we can easily deduce that E() = 13L  4 6(1 a)3(1+) . Now
because  > 1=3 we obtain E(FT ) > E(
) > E(ST ) > E(

0) as required. The calculations for
the SHFR equilibrium involve somewhat more tedious algebra such that we omit them for brevity.

7.11 Proof of Corollary 7
Clearly we can never have + = 1 because W (1) = W (0)   c. Moreover, if  2  the socially
optimal level of investment is + = 0 because the trading rate is at its maximum level of 1=3
even without FTs, rendering investment ine¢ cient. Hence assume that  2 . Notice that in this
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case we have W (1) = 0 which implies that we must have  < 1. Thus consider an interior
equilibrium  2 (0; 1) and assume that + > 0 (otherwise  > + is trivial). By denition
@W()
@

=+
= 0 and W () = c. Now notice that the chain rule implies that @W
()
@ =
W () + (1   )@WST ()@ + @W

ST ()
@   c and it is easy (albeit very cumbersome) to verify that
(1 )@WST ()@ +@W

ST ()
@ < 0 for all , such that we conclude that W
(+) > c. Finally, because
for  2  we have @W()@ < 0 for all ; this implies  > +.
To show that W () < W (0) for  > 0 it su¢ ces to consider the case where  2  and
 < 1. While again involving some lengthy computations, it is straightforward to verify that
W (0) = 2L=5 > W ST =
'1
'1+'

2
V LOST +
'2
'1+'

2
(L  E(ST )). 
8 Appendix B: Figures
8.1 Figure 1: Equilibrium Map
This graph depicts the functions FT () (blue), 

ST () (red) and 

S() (black) in the (; )-space,
where we have set L = 1. The green lines indicate the interval [; ).
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